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ABSTRACT Putting the recently adopted global Sustainable Development Goals or the
Paris Agreement on international climate policy into action will require careful policy choices.
Appropriately informing decision-makers about longer-term, wicked policy issues remains a
considerable challenge for the scientific community. Typically, these vital policy issues are
highly uncertain, value-laden and disputed, and affect multiple temporal and spatial scales,
governance levels, policy fields, and socioeconomic contexts simultaneously. In light of this,
science-policy interfaces should help facilitate learning processes and open deliberation
among all actors involved about potentially acceptable policy pathways. For this purpose,
science-policy interfaces must strive to foster some enabling conditions: (1) “representation”
in terms of engaging with diverse stakeholders (including experts) and acknowledging
divergent viewpoints; (2) “empowerment” of underrepresented societal groups by co-
developing and integrating policy scenarios that reflect their specific knowledge systems and
worldviews; (3) “capacity building” regarding methods and skills for integration and synth-
esis, as well as through the provision of knowledge synthesis about the policy solution space;
and (4) “spaces for deliberation”, facilitating direct interaction between different stake-
holders, including governments and scientists. We argue that integrated, multi-stakeholder,
scientific assessment processes—particularly the collaborative assessments of policy alter-
natives and their various implications—offer potential advantages in this regard, compared
with alternatives for bridging scientific expertise and public policy. This article is part of a
collection on scientific advice to governments.
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Introduction: science-policy interfaces for longer-term,
wicked policy problems
The global environmental challenges of the twenty-firstcentury affect the fundamental interests of billions ofpeople and other living beings, both now and into the
future. International climate policy in light of the Paris
Agreement, as well as the recently adopted global Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), are clear examples of policy goals
and processes focused on longer-term, “wicked”, yet vital policy
issues. Wicked policy problems are mainly characterized by
complexity1 and related interdependencies, high uncertainty,
divergence of viewpoints and values, and fluid problem
definition.2 This is also true for other grand challenges beyond
the environmental realm, such as global health, demographic
change and social welfare, and economic and financial crises.
(ICSU, 2010).
Wicked policy problems are complex because they typically
affect and involve multiple temporal and spatial scales, govern-
ance levels, policy fields, and socioeconomic contexts simulta-
neously. This is well illustrated by recent work on the relationship
between SDGs and climate policy goals (e.g., Jakob and Steckel,
2016; von Stechow et al., 2016). Sustainable development seems
to be among the wickedest current policy problems (Haas, 2004).
Given the many potential synergies and tradeoffs involved,
carefully considered policy choices are required. It remains
unclear what the most appropriate policy options are in these
cases, partly due to a lack of knowledge about the many direct
and indirect effects of policy options; conventional methods of
scientific inquiry usually do not suffice to address wicked issues
effectively (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1991; Turnpenny et al., 2009).
Three examples illustrate the importance of revealing and
addressing indirect effects of, for instance, climate policies:
 How to ensure climate protection without undermining the
right to development, given that economic development has
been linked to the exploitation of fossil fuels in the past?
 How to use bioenergy for climate change mitigation without
negatively affecting biodiversity, forest protection, water
availability and food security?
 How to tackle the distributional questions related to policy
instruments such as carbon pricing for climate change
mitigation?
There is thus an obvious need for scientific expertise informing
policy on these (and many other) wicked policy issues to better
understand, among other things, the available policy options and
their practical implications.
However, what are the best types of bridges between various
forms of scientific expertise and public policy processes—in short:
science-policy interfaces (SPIs)—to effectively and appropriately
inform decision-makers regarding longer-term, wicked policy
problems? This is the central question underlying this paper. The
longer-term, wicked policy issues amplify and specify some of the
old profound challenges for SPIs (Pielke, 2007; Hulme, 2009;
Aitsi-Selmi et al.., 2016; Kowarsch, 2016a; von Stechow et al..,
2016). First, the complexity of these policy issues makes it difficult
for scientific studies to address the high number of policy-
relevant aspects of the issues at stake in a truly integrated manner,
across disciplines and approaches. Second, another challenge is
high uncertainty resulting from the need to go beyond traditional
areas of research to address large-scale, long-term and non-linear
risks. However, increasing bodies of literature do not necessarily
reduce uncertainty and disagreement, particularly in the social
sciences where research is often not aggregated (Hunter and
Schmidt, 1996; van Slyke et al.., 2010). This also endangers
scientific credibility. Third, the contestable yet unavoidable
normative assumptions involved—such as those related to
prioritizing policy goals or means, policy evaluation criteria or
any evaluation of uncertainty (Putnam, 2004; Douglas, 2009;
Dietz, 2013)—raise questions of legitimacy, particularly if these
assumptions are related to power asymmetries, or the large
number actors with many diverging worldviews and interests.
Furthermore, related to these three challenges, there are also
tradeoffs between salience, credibility and legitimacy (Cash et al.,
2003; Mitchell et al., 2006), particularly when it comes to the
highly value-laden and often uncertain social-science evaluation
of controversial policy response options. If these challenges and
tradeoffs for SPIs on longer-term, wicked policy problems are not
appropriately addressed, these SPIs will be largely ineffective
because their effectiveness presupposes salience, credibility and
legitimacy from the perspective of various actors involved at SPIs
(Cash et al., 2003; Sarewitz, 2004; Pielke, 2007; Hulme, 2009;
Kowarsch, 2016b, Chapter. 3).
Large-scale, integrated scientific assessment processes are
examples of SPIs that are often used to address the longer-term,
wicked policy problems. There is currently a proliferation of, for
instance, global environmental assessments. More than 130 of
them have been initiated over the past four decades, mostly at the
behest of governmental bodies. Examples include the United
Nations Environment Programme’s (UNEP) Global Environment
Outlook (GEO) series and the assessment reports provided by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). However,
there are many calls for far-reaching reform of scientific
assessment processes, and some lament that they are overly
laborious, time-consuming, and institutionally or politically
constrained. Yet, while agreeing with the need for continuous
assessment reform, are the available alternatives—such as
standing expert committees, or scientific reports produced
without multi-stakeholder processes—better than large-scale
assessments for addressing longer-term, wicked policy problems?
We will argue that assessments, particularly when following the
Pragmatic-Enlightened Model (Edenhofer and Kowarsch, 2015),
are comparatively promising tools in this regard, because these
assessment processes have higher potential for facilitating
deliberative policy learning among all actors involved.
There is a large literature on assessments, their characteristics,
failures and reform options (e.g., Cash et al., 2003; Mitchell et al.,
2006; Norgaard, 2008a; Carraro et al., 2015; Victor, 2015; Aitsi-
Selmi et al., 2016). There are also many case studies (mostly on
national or sub-national scale) on various other SPIs (see
literature provided in the following section), as well as normative
models for scientific policy advice in general (e.g., Habermas,
1971; Pielke, 2007; Brown, 2009; Kowarsch, 2016b). Typically,
these studies move beyond the still predominant technocratic
model for scientific policy advice. Instead, ideals and goals of
deliberative democracy, and the potential role of scientific
expertise for policy learning and policy change (e.g., Hajer,
1993; Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004; Sabatier, 2007) are widely
discussed and acknowledged in the literature. However, these
concepts must be better translated into criteria (i.e. metrics of
success) for SPIs which should then be applied to evaluate the
ability of different SPIs to respond to longer-term, wicked policy
problems.
Based on a brief characterization of selected SPIs and
some criteria for SPIs mainly distilled from major “building
blocks” of deliberative policy learning, we discuss the extent to
which assessments, as SPIs, measure up against alternative
SPIs on longer-term, wicked policy problems—in terms of
their theoretical relative potential to realize these building blocks.
We then empirically analyse the extent to which assessments
actually contribute, as overall outcome, to deliberative policy
learning.
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Integrated scientific assessments, and other science-policy
interfaces
Let us briefly introduce the core characteristics of some selected
SPIs. We mainly focus on large-scale, integrated scientific
assessment processes here, because they turned out to be the
most promising SPIs for longer-term, wicked policy problems
(see further below).
The international community has mandated and supported a
number of prominent, large-scale assessments of environmental
issues in recent years (see IPBES, 2013 for an overview).
Conducting large-scale assessments requires hundreds of
researchers from different disciplines, experts from non-
academic institutions, and several years of collaborative knowl-
edge synthesis and significant financial resources. At present, a
diversity of projects at both global and sub-global scales can be
called “scientific assessments.” However, there is some confusion
about what this term means. Below, we propose a conceptualiza-
tion of contemporary integrated scientific assessments in the
context of public policy-making processes. However, we acknowl-
edge that there is considerable diversity among assessments,
which provide the different types of scientific outputs, and whose
characteristics can change over time. Nonetheless, three central
characteristics of integrated scientific assessments are:
 Assembling the available scientific knowledge (and identifying
research gaps) in order to provide a rich, interdisciplinary and
highly integrated image of the policy-relevant considerations.
Additionally, and to a greater extent than in literature reviews,
peer-reviewed synthesis of the available publications and
information is required to identify the confidence level that
can be associated with the scientific findings in assessments,
and to put the available scientific knowledge into decision-
making contexts by pointing out the potential implications for
policy debates. Synthesis necessarily involves “assessment” itself
and informed judgment, as well as a high level of integration
and coherence.
 Striving to provide policy-relevant scientific knowledge in a
publicly accessible manner to support public policy-making
processes and deliberation. This means formulating scientific
insights that may (1) help frame and define the societal
problem at stake, including the policy goals and objectives, (2)
shed more light on available policy means (such as policy
instruments, institutions, measures), and/or (3) reveal potential
or actual (ex post or ex ante) implications of these means in
terms of direct effects, adverse side effects (costs, risks, etc.) and
synergies (co-benefits).
 Taking into account different viewpoints in terms of con-
troversial scientific statements and approaches, uncertainty,
and disputed societal values and conflicting interests. Besides
making areas of disagreement transparent in the assessment
outputs, (1) engaging with policy-makers and other stake-
holders, as well as (2) involving a number of authors with
various backgrounds, approaches and viewpoints, are likely
assessment design elements to realize this. As such, assessments
can be regarded as formal social processes to scientifically
discuss policy-relevant issues, which usually facilitate learning
among the participants. Assessments usually are not advocacy
pieces.
To summarize, integrated scientific assessments are multi-
stakeholder processes for distilling and synthesizing knowledge in
particular fields to inform policy, involving (regionally and
intellectually) diverse experts and stakeholders (see Mitchell et al.,
2006, 3, for a more comprehensive definition). Depending on the
degree to which these characteristics are realized, one can
distinguish between smaller-scale and larger-scale assessments.
Many assessments are formally mandated by policy-makers,
which indicates demand and may facilitate their impact. An
intermediate scientific activity between standard research and
assessments is doing pre-assessments (or “pilot assessments”), for
instance meta-studies that aggregate knowledge to fill research
gaps identified in previous assessment processes.
The IPCC assessments will serve as one of our key examples of
assessments.3 The IPCC was created in 1988 by several
international organizations as an intergovernmental panel for
knowledge synthesis to inform climate policy, involving both
governments and scientists. The IPCC has become the leading
international body for assessing and synthesizing knowledge in
climate change and its potential environmental and socio-
economic impacts. Its core products are its lengthy periodical
Assessment Reports mainly produced by a decentralized,
worldwide network of thousands of scholars and experts
in order to assess the current state of scientific knowledge
in a scientifically sound and policy-relevant but not policy-
prescriptive manner. The IPCC’s scientific rigor, hybrid structure
and impact at the science-policy interface inspired a number of
other assessment processes following the IPCC model.
Having described some general common characteristics of the
diverse existing integrated scientific assessment processes as SPIs,
what should be more specific features of an assessment from a
normative perspective? The Pragmatic-Enlightened Model
(PEM), developed by Edenhofer and Kowarsch (2015) based on
John Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy of ends-means-interdepen-
dency, provides guidance on assessment design, at least for large-
scale assessments of wicked policy issues that face high
uncertainty and disputed value-laden viewpoints. For policy
evaluations, the PEM assumes the interdependency of policy
objectives, means and their implications. For example, the
extensive use of bioenergy for ambitious climate change
mitigation can negatively affect biodiversity and food security
which may require a revaluation of the means and even the initial
policy goals. Key claims of the PEM thus are (1) to thoroughly
explore the various practical implications of policy means in
quantitative and qualitative terms, making uncertainty transpar-
ent; (2) to explore and present alternative, disputed policy
pathways in the assessment, related to different policy objectives
and values; and (3) to engage diverse stakeholders at different
stages of the assessment process, enabling the co-production of
reliable knowledge based on scientific methods. The PEM
envisages the role of scientific experts as mapmakers of alternative
policy pathways and their implications, while policy-makers bear
the role of navigators. In this way, assessments (though not value-
free) may avoid policy-prescription, while still allowing for
learning about policy pathways. Although assessment always
implies value judgments and uncertainty, reliable and objective
scientific knowledge in assessments remains possible and
desirable (Kowarsch, 2016b). Assessments should strictly be
based on rigorous (and wherever possible, peer-reviewed)
scientific research.
Based on that, this paper will discuss two different types of
integrated scientific assessments: first, conventional integrated
scientific assessments; and second, medium-scale and large-scale
integrated scientific assessments that are more or less conducted
in the “spirit” of the ideals claimed by the PEM model. A
prominent example of such PEM-inspired assessments, as we call
them in this paper, is the recent contribution of the IPCC
Working Group III on climate change mitigation options to the
IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2014a; Edenhofer and
Kowarsch, 2015). However, for the purpose of this article, the
group of “PEM-inspired assessments” also include current or past
—but also potential future—assessment processes that do not
explicitly follow the recently developed PEM model, but at least
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are more or less in line with some core claims of the PEM, i.e. the
collaborative exploration of policy alternatives. We thus use the
term “PEM-inspired assessments” rather broadly in this paper.
Predominant alternative SPIs—which are used in the sub-
sequent sections to illustrate the relatively high potential of
integrated scientific assessments, particularly the PEM-inspired
ones—include:
1. Conventional peer-reviewed research papers and studies
addressing policy-relevant issues, including in particular
meta-studies (i.e., meta-analysis, model intercomparisons,
etc.) and pre-assessments;
2. Topic-specific, individual or small-group advice and consul-
tancy (relatively homogeneous intellectually, politically and
geographically; including, e.g., think tanks, lobby groups,
foundations, chief scientific advisors, learned societies, and
national research organizations), often one-off; mainly
through the provision of scientific reports to inform policy
based on self-determined processes (but also through direct
dialogue with decision-makers);
3. Permanent expert committees (or councils, or panels, or other
formalized structures) with formalized procedures which
provide direct (e.g., oral) advice to individual policy-makers
or parliaments, written policy briefs, or smaller reports, but
which do not provide more comprehensive, systematic
assessments;
4. Standardized impact assessment reports which are usually
more national or sub-national;
The core characteristics of these selected alternative SPIs
are summarized in Tables 1 and 2, together with major
characteristics of conventional and PEM-inspired integrated
scientific assessments.
These six key SPIs are by no means comprehensive. As
described by Kohler et al. (2012), a huge variety of SPIs have been
developed over the past 25 years as the need for deliberate
scientific input to decision-making has been increasingly
recognized. This paper explores a selection of key interfaces
employed regularly, which have been chosen to reflect the variety
of options, scales and actors involved. Within the six SPIs listed in
Tables 1 and 2, there is a high degree of variability. The different
SPIs were grouped in order to provide some stylized clustering of
the different interfaces which are not perfectly distinct. There is
sometimes a high degree of variability of the performance of a
particular format for scientific policy advice with regards to
different characteristics.
Many of these interfaces are interlinked; for example, large-
scale assessments often build on conventional research papers,
pre-assessments, smaller-scale assessments as well as the work
done at other SPIs. Conversely, for instance, research gaps
identified in large-scale assessments can often inspire new
directions for future research papers, pre-assessments and other
initiatives, and longer-term policy issues can also involve the need
for short-term scientific policy advice, etc.
Deliberative democratic theory provides criteria for science-
policy interfaces
We ground our discussion of the selected SPIs in a popular
branch of political theory—namely deliberative democratic
theory. While the reason for this might not be obvious at a first
glance, it is compelling upon further reflection. A central claim of
deliberative democratic theory (see also Box 1) is “that legitimacy
requires the right, opportunity, and capacity of those subject to a
collective decision to participate in consequential deliberation
about the decision” (Stevenson and Dryzek, 2012: 2). Unlike
traditional theories of representative democracy that primarily
link legitimacy and public consent solely to voting-mechanisms
or policy output, deliberative democratic theorists claim that
political decisions must be based on and linked to inclusive and
deliberative public debates—especially of those subject to these
decisions. In these deliberation processes, different arguments,
viewpoints and interests on a specific matter are brought up and
are exchanged to allow for mutual learning and reasoning among
all actors involved. Any decision made subsequently has to be
justified on the basis of this deliberation—it has to be made
plausible in light of the arguments heard before (Habermas,
1996b). This deliberation process can shape individual prefer-
ences by arguments and reasoning, going beyond blatant self-
interest. Legitimacy is thus conceptually linked with account-
ability, involving public reason-giving discourses aimed at both
informing and justifying public policy (Chambers, 2003: 308f).
Due to their rigorous methodologies and systematic analyses of
various policy aspects, the sciences as one societal subsystem can
and should provide knowledge relevant for policy deliberation.
Deliberative democratic theory is an appropriate normative
stance especially for discussing alternative SPIs responding to
longer-term, wicked policy problems. This is due to the particular
characteristics of these wicked issues described in the introduc-
tion, in light of which the strengths of deliberative democratic
theory as a normative grounding for SPIs become particularly
apparent. Given (1) the considerable multi-dimensionality and
complexity, (2) deep uncertainty, and (3) divergent normative
viewpoints and stakes involved in such policy issues (both
regarding potential solutions and the underlying problem
definition), no straightforward (scientific) method for identifying
appropriate policy pathways exists. Some experts might advocate
strong opinions on particular policy issues, but doing so relies
upon contestable normative assumptions. Rather, for effective
Deliberative democratic theory
Deliberative democracy is properly described as a family of theories,
including Dryzek’s “discursive” theory (Dryzek, 1990, 2010), Pettit’s
“republican-contestation” theory (Pettit, 2000), Chambers’ “reason-
able” democratic theory (Chambers, 1996), Young’s “communicative”
theory (Young, 1993), and, perhaps most famously, Habermas’
“deliberative politics” (Habermas, 1996a, 1996b,), and earlier works
such as Dewey (1927). Although these theories differ in important
respects, Wiklund has pointed out that the concept of a participatory
“voice” is common to all of them (Wiklund, 2005: 283). Dryzek
helpfully defines the key concept of deliberation itself as an actualiza-
tion of this voice within pluralistic public dialogue, which hopefully
“induces reflection upon preferences in a non-coercive fashion”
(Dryzek, 2000: 2). Chambers adds that deliberation is “debate and
discussion aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinions in
which participants are willing to revise preferences in light of discussion,
new information, and claims made by fellow participants” (Chambers,
2003: 309). The general process of deliberation itself can take many
forms. It can be very open and unbound (take the Internet as an
example of global scale) but also very narrow and bounded (think about
the members of a local floriculture club debating a new statute).
Deliberative processes can also be convincing for those who are
otherwise unaffiliated with deliberative democratic theory (Chambers,
2003: 308). In a report for the US National Academy of Sciences, Dietz
and Stern conclude that “substantial evidence shows that effective
public participation can help agencies do a better job in achieving public
purposes for the environment by ensuring better decisions and
increasing the likelihood that they will be implemented effectively”
(Dietz and Stern, 2008: 226). Well-designed public participation not
only “improves the quality and legitimacy of a decision and builds the
capacity of all involved to engage in the policy process”, but can also
“lead to better results in terms of environmental quality and other social
objectives” (Dietz and Stern, 2008: 226).
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Table 1 | Organizational and procedural setup of a selected few science-policy interfaces
Research studies (including meta-
studies, pre-assessments and so on)
Individual or small groups of
scientific advisors or
consultants
Permanent scientific advisory bodies
(not providing larger-scale
assessments)
Standardized impact
assessments
Conventional medium-scale to large-
scale integrated scientific assessments
Integrated
scientific
assessments in the
spirit of the PEM
Examples Transport and ETS (See https://
ideas.repec.org/p/ecc/wpaper/2.
html, accessed 15 May 2016);
ADAM (See https://www.pik-
potsdam.de/research/sustainable-
solutions/flagshipspld/
MitigationScenarios/adam/adam-
project, accessed 15 May 2016);
papers commissioned by, for
example, WHO, CBD and so on (See,
e.g., https://www.gov.uk/
government/collections/reducing-
risk-of-future-disasters#supporting-
evidence, http://www.who.int/hia/
health_indicators/en/, and http://
www.cbd.int/doc/health/guide-
biodiversity-health-en.pdf, accessed
15 May 2016)).
Reports by science
academies, think tanks, etc.
(see examples & discussions
in OECD, 2015; McGann
et al., 2014; Mentzel, 1999);
Chief Scientific Advisor
(CSA)
To national governments (that is, US
SAB and multiple sub-committees),
India SAC-PM and SAC-C) or to
International Conventions (for
example, UNFCCC SBSTA, UNESCO
SAB, CBD SBSTTA; EU SAM)
EU Impact
Assessment (See
http://ec.europa.
eu/smart-
regulation/impact/
index_en.htm,
accessed 15 May
2016)
Stern Review; UK Foresight Reports
( See https://www.gov.uk/
government/collections/foresight-
projects, accessed 15 May 2016); UN
Emissions Gap Report (See, for
example, http://www.unep.org/
publications/ebooks/
emissionsgapreport/, accessed 15
May 2016); HDR (See, for example,
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/
files/hdr14-report-en-1.pdf, accessed
15 May 2016); UNEP‘s GEO series;
GBO; IAASTD. See IPBES (2013) for
details and acronyms
IPCC WG III
AR5; MA;
envisioned IPBES
assessments
(see IPBES, 2013
for details and
acronyms)
Organizational and procedural setup
Number of
experts and
disciplines
Few (sometimes interdisciplinary) 1 to a few (sometimes410
authors, sometimes inter-
disciplinary)
Many (often 410, often inter-
disciplinary)
Often 415 authors,
often inter-
disciplinary
Very high number (usually 4100
authors, mostly interdisciplinary)
Very high
number (usually
4100 authors,
always inter-
disciplinary)
Author
selection process
Self-selected; rarely nominated, e.g.
if papers have been commissioned
Self-selected, or sometimes
nominated, e.g. CSA, or if
reports have been commis-
sioned
Often through formalized, criteria-
based nomination process
envisaging balanced representation
Usually nominated Formalized process, often many
divergent perspectives, and regional
representation
Highly
formalized
process, many
divergent
perspectives, and
regional
representation
Duration of
process
Between a few months and 1–2 years Often o1 year (sometimes
more)
Often for a set term, for example, 4
years
Ofteno2 years Usually several years Often 4–7 years
Governance
structure (incl.
formalization of
processes)
informal Mostly informal Often formalized, for example, under
guidance of a chairperson
Usually, parts of the
process are
formalized
Highly formalized re. committees,
procedures, conflict of interest
policies etc.
Highly
formalized re.
committees,
procedures,
conflict of
interest policies
and so on.
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Table 2 | Focus and methodology as well as relationship to stakeholders and political context of a selected few science-policy interfaces
Research studies (including
meta-studies, pre-assess-
ments, etc.)
Individual or small groups of
scientific advisors or
consultants
Permanent scientific advisory
bodies (not providing larger-
scale assessments)
Standardized impact
assessments
Conventional medium-scale to large-scale
integrated scientific assessments
Integrated scientific assessments in
the spirit of the PEM
Focus and methodology
Scope of
literature
Various, depending on
type of study
Most relevant literature;
sometimes synthesis of
additional literature.
Most relevant literature;
sometimes synthesis of
additional literature.
Synthesis of most
relevant literature
Relatively comprehensive synthesis of
literature
Relatively comprehensive
synthesis of literature
Policy options /
alternatives
explored
One or a few key options
(if policy analysis is done
at all)
One or a few key options
(policy analysis is often
done)
High variation, sometimes
several key options explored
Exploring a few (pre-
determined) options
Exploring several options (if policy
analysis is done at all)
Many alternative pathways,
options, and diverse practical
implications
Governance
levels & other
complexities
considered
rather few High variation, often only
a few; sometimes analysis
of interdependencies
High variation, often a few,
sometimes with analysis of
interdependencies
Only a few, sometimes
with analysis of
interdependencies
High variation, often multiple, and with
analysis of interdependencies
Several, and with extensive
analysis of interdependencies
Transparency
of levels of confi-
dence and
agreement
Some High variation, sometimes
only little
High variation, sometimes
high
Moderate to high High variation; moderate to very high Very high
Review process Double-blind formalized
peer review
High variation, often no
external peer-review
Usually extensive internal
review processes
Usually formalized
internal review
processes
High variation, often a larger group of
external reviewers sometimes
including policy makers and other
stakeholders
Large-scale, formalized, multi-
stage review process including
policy makers and other
stakeholders
Relationship to stakeholders and political context
Mandate from
governing bodies
Very rarely Rarely Nearly always Usually Mostly Mostly
Interaction
with stakeholders
(beyond
scientists)
If at all, usually only little
(and informally, i.e.
bilateral conversations)
High variation, sometimes
little (informally, or
surveys/ interviews)
Usually formalized
interaction with particular
governmental bodies
Usually formalized
interaction with
particular governmental
bodies
Very often, and increasingly observed
through multiple formats and with
many groups
Extensive, and through multiple
formats; many diverse groups
Inclusion of
divergent
viewpoints
If at all, overview of
major divergent
viewpoints; sometimes a
few scenarios
Sometimes overview of
major divergent
viewpoints; sometimes a
few scenarios
Often the committee itself
represents divergent views;
sometimes scenario
exploration
Exploration of a few
scenarios related to
pre-selected policy
alternatives
Overview and exploration of several
divergent viewpoints, sometimes
through co-produced scenarios
Exploration of many relevant
divergent viewpoints, mostly
through co-produced scenarios
Outreach and
communication
Little (beyond scientific
community)
Often extensive efforts Mostly extensive efforts Moderate Often extensive efforts Mostly extensive efforts
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and legitimate decision-making on these wicked policy problems,
an inclusive, open and integrated deliberation process about
policy problems and the policy solution space is essential,
involving diverse perspectives and actor groups as well as
scientific disciplines. Deliberative democratic theory rejects
technocratic approaches, according to which scientific experts
and engineers alone can comprehensively determine the most
appropriate policy options in an allegedly objective and reliable
manner. Drawing clear boundaries between allegedly “neutral”
scientific expertise on the one hand and value-laden policy-
making on the other is impossible. Technocratic approaches are
thus inappropriate here, and largely ineffective in terms of impact
on policy processes, inter alia due to the implicit, entangled and
often disputed value judgments and uncertainties (e.g. Jasanoff,
1990; Sarewitz, 2004; Pielke, 2007; Kowarsch, 2016b).
While aggregating and weighing individual preferences and
viewpoints in one form or another towards any kind of social
welfare is indispensable for collective policy-making and policy
evaluation, Arrow showed the infeasibility of traditional
economic approaches to preference aggregation (Arrow, 1970).
The aggregation of citizens’ individual interests through mere
voting mechanism, polls, or revealed preferences is either not
possible or not sufficient to determine social welfare and “the
public good”. However, well-designed deliberation processes
within SPIs can provide a valuable approximation in this regard;
they serve as valuable fora for exchanging and justifying
competing preferences, values and beliefs. This could lead to
learning processes where one’s own preferences might also
change over time, and it could facilitate an inclusive and
transparent process of deliberative preference aggregation that
can feed into political decision-making processes. Deliberative
design of SPIs aims at convergence on policy solutions where
possible—not as a result of individual bargaining power, but as a
result of public justification, which means providing and judging
on reasons. Hence, the purpose of deliberation also in SPIs is
simultaneously “epistemic and practical”, aiming “to uncover
facts about interests and equality and how best to pursue them for
the purpose of making good collective decisions” (Christiano,
2012: 27).
Additionally, deliberative and ongoing learning procedures
generate further benefits for dealing with wicked policy problems.
Actively involved agents in well-designed deliberation processes
may better understand the complexity and uncertainty connected
to policy decisions and have the opportunity to co-develop
appropriate policy options. Deliberative processes within SPIs can
thus increase the legitimacy and social acceptance of subsequent
policy decisions, making them more compelling, resilient and
sustainable than decisions based on mere bargaining between
interest groups. Wicked problems like climate change affect
people around the world in different regions and jurisdictions.
They are increasingly demanding an input into policy debates on
wicked problems according to their different vulnerabilities and
policy preferences. Some even argue that democratizing the
diverse forms of international science-policy discourse by means
of deliberative practices may well prove to be a “shorter road”
than democratizing the constitution of international institutions
(Dryzek, 1999: 35).
To conclude, although successful deliberation itself is demand-
ing (e.g. Ryfe, 2005), deliberative design of SPIs is indispensable
especially in response to wicked problems where simple all-
embracing and uncontroversial solution pathways do not exist
(Dietz, 2013). Precisely because of the multi-faceted complexity
and interdependencies of these problems, ongoing and transpar-
ent deliberation on available knowledge and response options is
essential—closely echoing John Dewey’s early call for open-ended
deliberative public experimentation of different means and
different goals, not least based on scientific methodology
(Dewey, 1927).
However, newly introducing extensive deliberation processes
might not be a top priority for all contexts of policy-making and
related SPIs on various governance levels. Urgent policy issues
might require rapid policy responses, such as to health crises (e.g.
the Ebola epidemic beginning in 2013–14), or natural disasters
and other catastrophes (e.g. the earthquake in L’Aquila 2009, or
the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011). Nevertheless, initiating
long-term deliberative learning processes might still be very
valuable, for instance to help deal with long-term impacts or to
increase preparation for future disasters.
We now expand on the basic deliberative ideals to distill more
specific criteria for discussing SPIs for longer-term, wicked
problems.
Distilling criteria from building blocks of deliberative policy
learning. SPIs should be designed to allow for deliberative and
inclusive, participatory learning and justification processes con-
cerning the wicked policy problems and the related policy solu-
tion spaces—in short: deliberative policy learning. Contributing to
deliberative policy learning should be a primary goal, and key
promise, of SPIs. While “deliberative” refers to the inclusive and
argumentative way of designing the process, “policy learning” can
be understood as an updating of beliefs about policies (i.e., their
rationale, performance or required institutions) resulting from a
combination of social interaction, personal experiences, value
change and scientific policy analysis (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2013).
Although SPIs can hardly ensure the comprehensive realization
of deliberative policy learning in political processes alone (see
section below on actual achievements of assessments for other
relevant factors), SPIs could at least realize some major building
blocks (i.e., enabling conditions) of deliberative policy learning
that are highlighted in the literature on deliberative democratic
theory. Table 3 provides an overview of four such major building
blocks and subsequent criteria for SPIs. We distill these criteria
from the building blocks in light of what was said in the
introduction about the policy context and the general roles and
guidelines for scientific expertise in these policy contexts. Being
consistent with, but going beyond the seminal SPI criteria of
salience, credibility, and legitimacy (see introduction), our criteria
thus envision the realization of four major building blocks of
deliberative policy learning within SPIs. This is similar to Miller
and Erickson’s approach (2006).
Representation, the first building block of deliberative policy
learning, aims at facilitating the inclusion of those subject to a
decision, and especially of competing voices. The encouragement
of greater public participation in policy debate—including
participation in the framing of policy goals, greater public
awareness of the need for cooperative solutions, and mutual
respect of differing viewpoints—can potentially lead to better
collective decision-making (Chambers, 2003: 316; see also
Gutmann and Thompson, 1996). Everyone who is affected by a
decision-making process should also have a chance to be involved
in the deliberative process leading to this decision. In democratic
societies, all citizens are part of the general public of their state
and are—at least in principle—able to participate, for instance by
raising their voice in the media, at public demonstrations, or to
organize into interest groups, including as members of political
parties. To claim effectiveness and legitimacy it is not necessary
for every viewpoint to find its way directly into a parliamentary
decision. Different institutions and actors can serve as inter-
mediate suppliers of a political core area to screen and structure
discourses, being an amplifier (as well as filter) for particular
messages and interests (Habermas, 1996b). The fairer, more equal
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and inclusive a deliberative procedure is, the more legitimate the
decision based on such a procedure would be. The better the link
between the multifaceted perception of a specific problem and a
decision-making body (or SPI) dealing with this problem, the
more effective it should be. To realize this goal, appropriate
representation is also of key importance for SPIs responding to
highly value-laden and disputed policy problems. This also is
easily observable, for example, in the IPCC where representation
is frequently a major issue discussed by the country delegations.
To distill criteria for SPIs from this building block, realizing
proper representation is fostered by incorporating both (1) a high
diversity of viewpoints and stakeholders, and (2) a wide variety of
scientific insights (Pregernig, 2006; Whitfield et al., 2011). The
latter should also include the representation of different
disciplinary knowledge as well as of knowledge systems that
transcend traditional scientific domains including, for example,
traditional ecological or local knowledge. Facing the global
magnitude of many wicked problems, engaging with all affected is
clearly infeasible. Nonetheless, the challenge for large-scale policy
advisory processes is to determine which stakes are relevant or
important enough to be incorporated into specific SPIs. Indeed,
this is often a point of contention. One potentially promising
method of addressing this is through discursive representation,
i.e. by identifying the most prominent societal discourses relevant
to a particular debate and ensuring they are represented—as for
instance in the case of discourses within United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotia-
tions (Stevenson and Dryzek, 2012). Discursive representation
could help to minimize the extent to which groups rely on power
in deliberations, and increasing the importance of higher-quality
arguments and rationalization (Deitelhoff, 2012).
Following this recurring tension between receptive representa-
tion and powerful interests, deliberative processes should also
enable some form of empowerment as the second building block.
This is relevant especially for previously marginalized groups or
overlooked viewpoints that have too little (institutional) power to
organize themselves appropriately e.g. across all policy levels, but
are meaningful enough to have a say in the specific policy process.
Many proposals for actual methods of empowering marginalized
viewpoints within a deliberative democratic framework might
have been vague at best (Chambers, 2003), leaving much room
for improvement. Both sensitivity at the input side, which
involves scrutinizing access barriers for marginalized viewpoints,
and sensitivity regarding their requirements to adequately
participate during the process are essential aspects of empower-
ment. This also applies to SPIs designed in response to wicked
problems. Regarding global environmental assessments, for
example, attempts to create a unified scientific framework to
inform policy also fostered the exclusion of many voices from
having a meaningful input to global decision-making (Miller,
2003,2004). Prominent examples for exclusion include indigenous
groups, local knowledge-holders, or academic disciplines tradi-
tionally excluded from the provision of scientific policy advice.
Indigenous and local groups often don’t have the financial or
institutional means to organize visibility for their perspectives,
even though those might clarify important trade-offs of policy
solutions on the ground. Avoiding such exclusion is an ongoing
challenge for SPIs with deliberative aspirations (Berkes et al.,
2006). Empowerment therefore aims to diminish unjustified
barriers on the input side, and to enable meaningful contribution
of marginalized viewpoints to scientific policy advice.
More specific criteria for SPIs thus target the inclusion of
marginalized viewpoints, different disciplinary insights, local
knowledge systems or institutional knowledge both (1) by actively
targeting underrepresented viewpoints at SPIs and (2) by active
organizational support for marginalized groups throughout
science-policy processes. To realize the former, experts and
marginalized stakeholders could, for instance, co-produce
elaborate policy options or broader policy scenarios that are in
line with the knowledge systems, values and educational back-
grounds of the marginalized stakeholders, and finally integrate
these policy options and scenarios back into the scientific policy
advisory process (using deliberation and tools appropriate for
integrating knowledge systems). While Wiklund notes that the
tools, such as public hearings and submissions, usually used to
foster participation in science-policy interactions are limited,
there is “an increasing experimentation with more inclusive,
dialogue-based tools” (Wiklund, 2005: 289). One example of a
highly promising tool to integrate knowledge systems and
empower marginalized viewpoints is participatory scenario
development (Patel et al., 2007). A very functional tool for
providing organizational support throughout the process is, for
instance, to install secretariat-like bodies responsive to the
individual needs of participating stakeholders.
Effective deliberative policy learning also presupposes capacity
building as another important building block. Deliberative
democratic theory often claims that all participating individuals
ideally have appropriate capacity to constructively contribute to
and influence decision-making (Cohen, 1997). This is especially
important to avoid perpetuating extant power structures which
tend to favour more highly educated and already empowered
individuals or groups. While achieving equal capacity among
Table 3 | Overview of criteria for science-policy interfaces responding to wicked policy issues, distilled from building blocks of
deliberative policy learning
Building block Criteria for SPIs
Representation Incorporating wide variety of viewpoints and stakeholders Input side
Incorporating wide variety of scientific insights and disciplines Input side
Empowerment Critically scrutinizing access barriers; supporting development of policy options and scenarios reflecting
marginalized viewpoints
Input side
Critically scrutinizing requirements to adequately participate; organizational support throughout the process During the
process
Capacity building Building internal capacity of participants: knowledge integration and synthesis During the
process
Realizing external capacity building: providing knowledge about implications of alternative policy pathways,
disclosing key uncertainties and normative assumptions
Output side
Spaces for
deliberation
Realizing continuous and iterative face-to-face deliberation During the
process
Realizing vertical and horizontal linkage of spaces for deliberation Input and
output side
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participants is likely impossible, two things can still be done: first,
realizing internal capacity building of the participants to allow for
meaningful iteration and intellectual progress in deliberation
processes, and second, realizing external capacity building, for
instance by transparent deliberations and insights, leading to an
accessible outcome for subsequent decision-making. Effective
capacity building is also decisive for SPIs, especially if they aim to
contribute significantly to the resolution of longer-term, wicked
policy problems (Miller and Erickson, 2006).
Two more specific criteria can be distilled from the aim of
capacity building: (1) the diverse participating stakeholders
should have the chance to learn not only how to approach
different information and knowledge properly, but also how to
integrate and synthesize different kinds of knowledge in a
scientifically sound, collaborative and policy-relevant manner
(internal capacity building). While working collaboratively with
multiple disciplines and knowledge systems is no easy task, the
iterative learning process among various actors in this regard may
also create long-term benefits for many SPI participants. (2) Even
more importantly, SPIs should provide the public with capacity in
terms of the required knowledge about different policy pathways
and their practical implications (see introduction). This external
capacity building presupposes an integration (but not necessarily
reconciling) and synthesis of knowledge across different dis-
ciplines and knowledge systems, and requires transparency of key
uncertainties and normative assumptions. Such explorations of
the policy solution space can become a valuable point of reference
for decision-making processes, potentially even across governance
levels.
A final key building block aims at the provision of actual spaces
for deliberation. Without direct interactions between different
stakeholders, deliberative policy learning can hardly be realized
(Wiklund, 2005). Deliberation processes among multiple stake-
holders can stimulate mutual understanding and learning; these
communicative activities can also increase mutual trust and
enhance cooperation (Cole, 2015). For SPIs, the dynamics of
continued and inclusive face-to-face deliberation can facilitate
reasonable policy learning and even convergence regarding the
multifaceted viewpoints and different disciplinary accounts, and
may change individual and collective preferences. Engaging in
interdisciplinary collaboration seriously, and challenging tradi-
tional problem framings or other assumptions in new ways, are
examples of how spaces for deliberation can facilitate new
insights and increase the evidence base particularly regarding the
policy solution space (Reid et al., 2006). In contrast, technocratic
approaches might at best advocate limited input from non-
scientific actors to e.g. co-determine the initial scope of an
individual SPI process or by holding a session where the results
are in essence “taught” to policy-makers, following a linear model
of SPIs. Moreover, linkage of different (already existing or novel)
spaces for deliberation is crucial to increase the effectiveness of
deliberation processes and their influence on various policy
processes on different governance levels, and to allow for mutual
inputs to and exchange between different spaces for deliberation
(including exchange with other scales and government levels) at
the input side or output side of SPI processes. Linking with other
deliberation processes can also reduce the burden of expectations
for an individual deliberation space (e.g. within SPIs).
Two specific criteria for SPIs directly from this building block
thus are: (1) the provision of effective opportunities for
continuous, open and iterative face-to-face deliberation between
different stakeholders involved at SPIs (including governmental
officials and scientists); and (2) a high degree of vertical and
horizontal linkage of spaces for deliberation. The former can
considerably be fostered by having an appropriate and clear
mandate from governing bodies in this regard. In some cases,
SPIs may benefit from technical tools such as online platforms to
decrease the various costs of face-to-face meetings involving large
groups. Regarding the second criterion, inputs to global SPI
processes from lower-scale spaces for deliberation could be
realized, for instance, by integrating the findings of local or
regional mini-publics (Niemeyer, 2014), by organizing regional
consultation processes or by affiliating to existing subsidiary SPI
bodies on the national or local level. Linkage at the output side of
SPIs can help ensure proper utilization and dissemination of the
SPI products and results (Cash et al., 2006). This linking can
increase the efficiency of resource-intensive deliberation processes
by taking advantage of what is already being done and expanding
the network of involved and interested actors beyond what the
original process might have achieved. Linking to policy processes,
for example by directly engaging with actors who play a role in
policy debates, is crucial for SPIs to have an influence on
decisions (Fouilleux, 2004).
All these criteria will guide our discussions of alternative SPIs
for longer-term, wicked policy issues. However, these criteria are
limited in several respects: (1) they do not cover all possible
aspects of deliberative policy learning, but only focus on a few
crucial aspects as a “proxy” to deliberative policy learning; and (2)
these criteria would be insufficient to comprehensively guide the
design of all varieties of SPIs, which would require more specific
and differentiated criteria (also with regards to potential trade-
offs between the four building blocks or with other values). The
primary purpose of our criteria is to help reveal the relative
prospects of alternative SPIs responding to wicked issues in the
following section. Despite these limitations, our criteria are
potentially valuable means for drawing attention to the most
normatively important aspects (based on widely accepted ideals
from the diverse literature on deliberative democracy), rather
than highlighting only some more “technical” requirements for
SPIs or overly narrow metrics of SPI successes.
Realizing the building blocks of deliberative policy learning
Employing these criteria for what all SPIs should envisage when
addressing longer-term, wicked policy problems, we now discuss
the relative extent to which different SPIs may contribute to
deliberative policy learning in terms of potentially realizing the
major building blocks. Due to space constraints, we cannot
comprehensively discuss all SPI types (six) in light of all criteria
(eight). Rather, for each of the building blocks and related criteria,
we selectively elaborate in this section on those SPIs that show
relatively high potential—which will mostly be large-scale
assessments, particularly the PEM-inspired ones. Aside from
considering the relative prospects of particular SPIs, we also point
out major challenges, conditions and limitations of SPIs in
meeting the criteria distilled above.
The main method used for this discussion is to conceptually
combine the characteristics of different SPIs identified above (see
particularly Tabs. 1 and 2) with the criteria (see Table 3 for an
overview). We hypothesize about the implications of different SPI
designs for the potential of these SPIs to meet the criteria. As
such, our method is mainly theoretical, but will be complemented
by some empirical underpinnings and illustrated by various
examples. While this section cannot provide a full-fledged
evaluation and empirical comparison of the alternative SPIs, it
may offer an interesting set of hypotheses on the performance of
alternative SPIs that could be further examined in future, specific
comparative case studies.
Realizing representation. As discussed above, wicked policy
problems involve a wide array of disputed issues and competing
stakes. This complexity actually presents SPIs with an
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opportunity to realize the criteria associated with representation
and to be regarded as relatively legitimate (Mitchell et al., 2006;
Norgaard, 2008a; Reed, 2008; Kowarsch, 2016b). One way to
achieve this is by designing SPIs to be collaborative and inclusive
processes, striving for fair and equal representation of different
viewpoints and stakeholders as well as incorporating insights
from a wide variety of scientific disciplines. SPIs must be trans-
parent in their activities in order to remain accountable to the
diversity of individuals and groups represented.
Large-scale integrated scientific assessments seem to have great
potential in this regard. Some prominent examples of highly
inclusive and collaborative SPI processes include the Millenium
Ecosystem Assessment (MA), the International Assessment of
Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Develop-
ment (IAASTD), and the more recently established Intergovern-
mental Platform for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES).
Both the MA and the IAASTD assessment processes explicitly
engaged with diverse groups who had multiple roles and
participated in a diversity of activities over the course of entire
assessment processes (Norgaard, 2008a; Feldman and Biggs,
2012). The latter was expressly designed as a social experiment in
terms of bringing such a diversity of viewpoints and stakeholders
together (Watson, 2009). The IPBES process, which has built
upon knowledge gained inter alia by the MA, IAASTD and IPCC,
can be seen as the most ambitious assessment to date regarding
inclusiveness. While some have criticized IPBES for not yet living
up to these ambitions (Hotes and Opgenoorth, 2014; Montana
and Borie, 2016), IPBES has nonetheless made significant strides
in terms of encouraging collaboration between a broad diversity
of disciplinary expertise, explicitly striving to achieve a balance of
participants according to gender, geographic location and
affiliation, and openly acknowledging and integrating different
knowledge systems and viewpoints in both its design and
assessment practices (Díaz et al., 2015). In addition, all PEM-
inspired assessments4 can, in theory, strongly contribute to
realizing representation also by emphasizing the explicit,
transparent and direct inclusion of divergent viewpoints and
different policy narratives in the exploration of alternative policy
pathway scenarios (Edenhofer and Kowarsch, 2015; Kowarsch,
2016b). The explicit discussion of some divergent viewpoints and
normative assumptions in the recent IPCC Working Group III
assessment of climate change mitigation options is a good
example in this regard.
Compared with nearly all other SPIs, large-scale assessments
are long-term processes with a high profile and often an
intergovernmental structure. Engaging with diverse stakeholder
groups and their viewpoints is usually part of their practice.
Moreover, they can often be more multi- and interdisciplinary
than other SPIs simply because of the higher number of experts
involved that may represent different disciplines and competing
approaches, also due to the more elaborate author nomination
processes (see Tabs. 1 and 2 for details). Large-scale integrated
scientific assessments, particularly the PEM-inspired ones, thus
have a higher potential for achieving the criteria associated with
representation as compared to, for example, conventional
research papers, policy reports, expert panels, or impact
assessments, which usually do not engage so extensively with
stakeholders, or with diverse viewpoints.
However, there are also numerous challenges and limitations to
realizing representation in assessments and other SPIs (Sénit
et al., 2016), of which we will highlight three. Firstly, there are
inevitable and significant legitimacy issues involved in selecting,
interpreting and evaluating the societally most relevant view-
points. This challenge might actually be less pronounced at lower
levels, for example in smaller-scale impact assessments where
identifying the most relevant stakes and selecting representatives
for these groups might involve less controversy. Questioning the
legitimacy of who exactly is included in deliberations in turn leads
to questioning the deliberative learning process itself as well as
decisions the process contributes to.
Secondly, there are numerous methodological barriers which
must be overcome in order for the social sciences and other
traditionally underrepresented disciplines to more meaningfully
participate in SPIs. For example, there is still a long way to go in
order for social sciences to be able to rigorously translate
divergent worldviews into consistent policy scenarios and their
evaluation, and to respond to the most pressing societal
questions, such as political economy features (e.g. winners and
losers) of policies (Norgaard, 2008a; Carraro et al., 2015; Victor,
2015). In addition, existing social science methods that support
the integration of various viewpoints like participative scenario
development tend to be based on contradicting epistemological
principals, as they come from different schools of thought which
makes their integration difficult (Schultz, 2006; van Asselt et al.,
2010).
Thirdly, the potential for legitimate representation of divergent
viewpoints when assessing policy pathway scenarios is limited by
the fact that a single assessment process can realistically only
explore a few such scenarios in-depth (in terms of multi-criteria
policy evaluation) since this is typically resource-intensive. This
means that some potential scenarios, which might be preferable
to some viewpoints or better reflect some knowledge systems,
must be excluded from the analysis in order for it to remain
feasible. Moreover, there can be resistance in some assessments
from particular governments or other interest groups against an
open exploration of alternative policy viewpoints and pathways
(Edenhofer and Minx, 2014).
Realizing empowerment. As several case studies suggest, inclu-
sive SPI processes can help empower local communities and
marginalized social groups (O’Faircheallaigh, 2010), and integrate
indigenous and other knowledge systems with prevalent scientific
discourses (e.g. Berkes et al., 2006 on MA; Thaman et al., 2013 on
IPBES). But which SPI is most promising in this regard?
In terms of supporting the development of policy options and
scenarios that reflect marginalized viewpoints (as the first
criterion associated with empowerment), there are significant
opportunities for empowerment at smaller SPI scales (see Tabs 1
and 2 for details), and in fact working at a lower scale can actually
improve the specificity of approaches to certain groups and
enable a more comprehensive understanding of power asymme-
tries. For example, as acknowledgement of the power dynamics at
play in environmental impact assessments has increased so too
has research seeking to improve the level of equality between
different participants (e.g. Cashmore and Richardson, 2013). In
addition, scenario exercises have been undertaken in smaller scale
SPI activities, for example in coastal planning (Tomkins et al.,
2008) and land use assessments in the United Kingdom
(Foresight, 2010) and in multi-scale assessments seeking to
integrate knowledge accumulated at local scales into progressively
larger-scale processes (Kok et al., 2007).
However, these examples also show that emphasizing empow-
erment through participatory scenario-building requires longer
time frames, access to the expertise necessary to organize such
exercises, as well as mechanisms to motivate participation
amongst marginalized groups. If scenarios are not co-developed
but rather provided in a top-down fashion, or if only “advocacy
pieces” for powerful groups are provided, they lack the sensitivity
to marginalized groups’ reality required for empowerment by
forgoing deliberation, lowering their potential for realizing this
building block.
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The larger resource requirements (particularly in terms of
time) for empowerment, which may be out of reach for some
SPIs, point towards a higher potential for empowerment—in
terms of both criteria associated with this building block—
through large-scale scientific assessments which last for several
years, even though these may be poorly funded in some cases.
One example of how large-scale assessments can support the
development of particular policy pathways can be found in
UNEP’s Global Environment Outlook (GEO) Small Island
Developing States (SIDS) Outlook, which provided a valuable
source of information as well as a cohesive narrative for an often-
marginalized group of countries in international negotiations on
environmental and development issues. Another example is the
IAASTD, which went to great lengths to ensure that minority
voices were heard and taken seriously, thus empowering, for
example, small-scale farmers, and especially women (Stokstad,
2008; Labbouz and Treyer, 2010). The MA employed a
participatory scenario-building exercise which expressly aimed
at integrating different epistemologies including across qualitative
and quantitative information sources, across major disciplinary
divides, as well as across scientific knowledge and other systems
(including local and traditional ecological knowledge). This
scenario-building exercise served to empower different groups
by identifying and then striving to restore balance to power
asymmetries observed in previous assessments (Bennett and
Zurek, 2006). Moreover, one could argue that any assessment
seriously following the PEM science-policy model, given its idea
of a cartography of alternative policy pathways, also would put
high emphasis on the collaborative development of policy options
and scenarios that reflect relevant, but marginalized viewpoints.
PEM-inspired assessments thus seem to provide a clear
theoretical avenue for the integration of minority viewpoints
and marginalized groups.
Also in terms of critically scrutinizing requirements to
adequately participate (e.g. organizational support throughout
the process), many large-scale assessment processes might be
more promising than other SPIs (for example, the rather supply-
driven one-off studies, see Tabs. 1 and 2), given their formalized,
longer-term procedures and institutions in this regard. This may
be particularly true for intergovernmental assessment bodies
related to UN processes, such as GEO or the IPCC assessments,
for instance.
Besides the costs (in terms of time, funds and so on), another
major challenge—for all SPIs—with realizing the two criteria
associated with empowerment is that altering pre-existing power
structures during the course of SPI activities could have unknown
and potentially adverse side effects. Since it “appears unlikely that
those who hold power will yield gracefully to groups pushing for a
share of it,” altering the balance of power through SPIs runs the
risk of actually entrenching power asymmetries if the groups in
power push back (O’Faircheallaigh, 2010: 23). Furthermore,
participation in SPI processes presupposes at least a certain
degree of empowerment already, at least in the sense that there is
some form of organization and the potential for representation
which would enable participation. For the most marginalized
societal groups, this is rarely the case and some form of
empowerment must actually occur before participation in SPI
processes, and potentially further empowerment through these
processes, can take place (Esteves and Vanclay, 2009).
Realizing capacity building. While participants in smaller-scale
SPI activities (see Tabs. 1 and 2) likely also learn about synthe-
sizing knowledge through their participation, the specific char-
acteristics of large-scale assessments (see above) make this type of
capacity-building not only a precursor to successfully producing
an assessment, but also require learning to be more diverse in
terms of the sheer number of disciplines, stakeholders and dif-
ferent viewpoints involved. Interdisciplinary scientific assess-
ments for environmental governance, like the IPCC, MA or
UNEP assessments, prompt a general shift in scientists’ per-
spective from local to global and disciplinary to interdisciplinary,
broaden their perspectives and help them to develop deeper and
richer analyzes of complex systems (Norgaard, 2008b). Recurring
assessments, which often have at least some returning scientific
experts from one cycle to the next, can benefit from the experi-
ence that these returning experts gained in previous assessment
cycles in terms of interdisciplinary collaboration and knowledge
integration and synthesis. This is important since these tasks go
beyond common academic endeavors and require learning
together.
Building capacity inter alia for working across disciplines and
knowledge synthesis is, however, no easy task. Since participants
of large-scale assessments are nearly always volunteers, a major
challenge with this is ensuring that actors still have motivation
and incentives to participate given the significant demands their
participation entails (Carraro et al., 2015). Norgaard reflected that
in the context of the MA “[m]ultiscientist deliberation requires
considerable humility, hard work, respect, and patience” (2008b:
6). One potential way forward could be programs such as the
IPCC “Chapter Scientists” program, which decreases the burden
on authors while also enables learning amongst early career
researchers (Schulte-Uebbing et al., 2015).
Moreover, as the “external capacity building” criterion claims,
public debates on longer-term, wicked policy problems require a
credible, rigorous synthesis of the available knowledge (and
uncertainties) across different disciplines, including insights from
different worldviews and working with different knowledge
systems in a policy-relevant manner—which primarily means
the exploration of the direct and indirect effects of available
alternative policy options. This in turn requires the capacity to
not only acknowledge and understand knowledge from diverse
perspectives but also to work collaboratively to integrate it.
All of the SPIs presented in Tabs. 1 and 2 can build external
capacity in terms of enabling policy learning and influencing
decision making. This is particularly the case when a SPI has a
direct path of influence on decisions, as is often the case for
example with impact assessments (O’Faircheallaigh, 2010) or with
other SPI activities which were expressly requested by policy
makers.
However, large-scale integrated scientific assessments seem to
have particularly high potential here (Mitchell et al., 2006;
Norgaard, 2008a; Kowarsch, 2016a); in fact this is their major
strength when measured up against alternative SPIs. Ideally, these
assessments provide a systematic processes for knowledge
synthesis and integration involving a large number of scientific
experts from different disciplines, elaborate synthesis methodol-
ogies as well as extensive, multi-stage peer-review processes to
ensure credible results. When designed and conducted this way,
such assessments can integrate knowledge across different
disciplines, competing approaches and various policy fields in a
more rigorous, credible and comprehensive manner than, for
example, policy advice or consulting provided by smaller, and
more homogeneous groups of experts (particularly if they lack
peer-review). Again, PEM-inspired assessments may have
particularly high potential regarding the provision of policy-
relevant knowledge maps (that is, external capacity building), in
the sense that the focus on exploring policy alternatives and their
implications emphasizes a highly policy-relevant knowledge
synthesis, which explicitly includes of a vast diversity of
viewpoints, disciplines and approaches, and could directly
address disputed normative issues as well.5 Such an emphasis
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can increase the quality, comprehensiveness and credibility of
knowledge synthesis to inform policy processes.
Furthermore, the potential scale of influence of large-scale
assessments (see below for examples) give them a higher relative
potential in terms of external building capacity among much
larger groups, compared with other SPIs. In addition, inter-
governmental large-scale assessment processes can provide the
necessary methodologies for national actors to take environ-
mental policy-making forward domestically, thus building
external capacity which has been acknowledged by numerous
governments in the process of reforming the IPCC (2013). Large-
scale assessments can also motivate smaller-scale SPI activities.
For example, the GEO-5 assessment process was a catalyst and
provided the methodological foundations for regional assess-
ments all over the world (Ivanova, 2009).
Table 4 provides an overview of some theoretical advantages of
PEM-inspired and other assessments regarding the realization of
both internal and external capacity building.
However, given the methodological, organizational and other
limitations and challenges that large-scale assessments face (for
example, Carraro et al., 2015; Victor, 2015), a fully comprehen-
sive assessment of all relevant aspects of the complex policy
solution space as ideally envisaged by the PEM is impossible. A
further limitation to this approach is that many scientists and
decision-makers continue to underestimate the need for, and
significant challenges of, seriously and rigorously exploring policy
pathways and their implications.
Another major challenge regarding external (but also internal)
capacity building is the exploding literature in some fields. Many
large-scale assessments, such as the IPCC assessments, envisage
the provision of comprehensive assessments of the available
literature. This is a noble idea. However, as the example of
exploding literatures on climate change clearly shows
(Grieneseisen and Zhang, 2011), the high number of existing
publications in this field implies huge challenges for current
assessment-making, and perhaps requires more sophisticated
bibliometric methods in future assessment processes.
A further challenge related to external capacity building is that
it is hard to prove that policy actors have indeed learned from the
outputs of an SPI process. A truthful evaluation of the overall
influence of one single SPI is hard, and can at best be conducted
after one or two decades (Sabatier, 1988). Yet, multiple analyses
illustrated that assessments have contributed to problem
recognition, alternative narratives and conceptualizations of
environmental changes and new framing of problems (Miller,
2000; Farrell and Keating, 2006; van Deveer, 2006; see below for
more details). The influence of science on policy via discourses
and frames result from a multitude of activities in which multiple
political actors are involved and which they pursue simulta-
neously. Policy change results from the cumulative learning and
deliberative processes.
Realizing spaces for deliberation. Spaces for deliberation can be
provided by several SPIs if they facilitate the direct (or at least
indirect, but effective) interaction between different stakeholders,
including governments and scientists. While direct face-to-face
interactions in particular can engender trust, in-person meetings
are costly, and this cost only increases with the scale of the SPI
and the related in-person meetings. Large-scale assessments
which strive to bring a large and diverse group of individuals
together, for example as in the IAASTD or GEO-5 regional
consultations, must invest large amounts of resources (both time
and funds) inter alia in designing the meetings, selecting the
stakeholders and actually convening participants for a long
enough time to enable deliberation. However, this seems T
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worthwhile. The MA, which also aimed to foster spaces for
deliberation between very diverse actors seems to have been
successful in the sense that “MA participants formed a learning
community to connect their disparate disciplinary perspectives on
socioecological systems” (Norgaard, 2008b: 6). Similarly, all PEM-
inspired assessments may have a high potential to provide spaces
for deliberation through their direct and collaborative exploration
of highly relevant alternative policy pathways and their
implications.
Other SPIs, such as conventional research, meta-studies with
particular policy-relevance, or small-group policy advice (for
example, the various policy recommendations provided by
different competing reports), usually do not extensively provide
such an opportunity for face-to-face interactions with diverse
individuals, at least not to the extent observed in large-scale
assessments. Impact assessments also often do not involve such
extensive multi-stakeholder deliberation processes, often facilitat-
ing instead a one-way flow of information from the public to the
assessment, identifying major potential impacts and making
judgments regarding their perceived severity through public
consultation meetings (Wiklund, 2005). This could in theory be
done in a deliberative manner, for example having different actors
explicitly explain arguments and values underlying their prior-
itizations of different impacts, which is augmented by the explicit
mandate for most impact assessments to convene affected
individuals (Bartlett and Baber, 1999; Wiklund, 2005). However,
this is rarely achieved in reality, often because of time constraints
posed by the pending project which prompted the impact
assessment in the first place. Permanent expert committees and
different types of integrated scientific assessments can better
facilitate the provision of spaces for face-to-face deliberation, and
can carry the authority to convene diverse groups which might
not otherwise sit down together. That being said, multi-
stakeholder, collaborative assessment processes theoretically have
even higher potential in this regard due to the (ideally) extensive
and formalized, large-scale involvement of so many different
stakeholders over a very long period of time. The length of
engagement is important as, in combination with face-to-face
meetings, ongoing engagement can help to build trust over time
which is an important precondition for truly open deliberation
(Stevenson and Dryzek, 2012).
An interesting example here is the innovative mechanism that
was introduced by UNEP to facilitate the production of GEO-
SIDS and to provide a space for deliberation via an online
platform organizing participants into communities of practice.
Organizing meetings in person for such a geographically
disparate group of participants given the short timeline and
limited resources available would have been practically infeasible.
Providing an online forum through UNEP Live, and organizing
work via well-thought-out Communities of Practice, seems to
have overcome this challenge and contributed strongly to a
deliberative democratic learning process in GEO-SIDS. However,
many participants had already engaged together in face-to-face
deliberations in the past and so were already well-acquainted and
had built up some degree of trust. This highlights the fact that
perhaps online mechanisms can add value by building off of face-
to-face meetings, but it is unlikely that remote deliberation can
completely replace coming together in person.
However, a number of internal and external obstacles can limit
ability to provide effective spaces for deliberation and are relevant
to numerous SPIs (for example, Reed, 2008). Participatory
mechanisms can be misused, for instance when prioritizing
scientific expert participation in face-to-face meetings and only
including non-scientific viewpoints through voting mechanisms,
in case of an excessive focus on participation as a stand-alone
method rather than conceptualizing it as part of a broader
process, or by providing cursory spaces for deliberation in which
participants’ inputs are not taken seriously or are used only to
provide post-hoc justifications for pre-determined decisions.
Another challenge of providing spaces for deliberation within
SPIs is to still come to clear and highly policy-relevant
conclusions, even if they are undesirable for some of the political
parties involved (for example, Edenhofer and Minx, 2014). In any
case, effective deliberation presupposes the realization of the
other SPI criteria discussed above.
Concerning the second criterion associated with spaces for
deliberation, forging vertical and horizontal linkages, both to
other SPIs and to decision-making processes, is a crucial part of
realizing spaces for deliberation to adequately frame problems
and their solutions. Forging these linkages presupposes knowl-
edge of the complex and ever-changing landscape of different
SPIs and decision-making processes, which might perhaps be
more efficiently accomplished by a larger-scale process with a
better overview of such a landscape as compared to a smaller-
scale process. Often, the institutions mandating or involved in
overseeing large-scale assessments have pre-existing linkages to or
at least a strong knowledge of other SPI processes. However, it is
important to note that this does not necessarily mean that the
assessment process will capitalize on these linkages. One
challenge, for example, is that there could be some sense of
competition between different SPIs which leave organizers
hesitant to share information or the fruits of intensive deliberative
processes.
The Regional Consultations organized for the GEO-5 assess-
ment, for instance, have been an attempt to convene representa-
tives of the public at smaller scales and to coordinate their
contribution to larger-scale decision-making via the large-scale
assessments process. There are also vertical linkages between
regional-scale GEO assessments and the global process which
capitalize on deliberative processes contributing to these smaller-
scale SPIs in the global assessment. Such linkages also exist in
other SPIs. For example, the multi-scale assessments mentioned
earlier which in one case involved deliberation via scenario-
building exercises on the topic of land degradation and potential
mitigation measures at local scales, the results of which were then
incorporated into further participatory scenario exercises as part
of a larger Mediterranean regional-scale assessment (Kok et al.,
2007). However, given the scale of large-scale assessments, their
scope for identifying relevant deliberative SPI processes, as well as
their relatively higher profile and ability to provide motivation for
other SPIs to engage with them, large-scale assessments would
fare comparatively well in terms of realizing linkages between
spaces for deliberation.
One of the most prominent examples of engaging with policy
actors in SPIs is through the approval processes which often come
at the end of a large-scale assessments process. Here, policy
makers representing governments from around the world come
together to approve the final documents and in some case
negotiate the text of a summary for policymakers document.
While some argue that bringing policy makers into deliberations
about content results in watering down of findings based on
political (and unscientific) reasoning, this process nonetheless
creates higher governmental buy-in and mutual learning than
scientific reports or expert panels without stakeholder engage-
ment (Mitchell et al., 2006; Norgaard, 2008a; Reed, 2008;
Kowarsch, 2016a). Such buy-in can enable the effective use of
assessments as a deliberative learning platform. Impact assess-
ments and the public deliberations they employ also have a direct
linkage to policy debates, since they are formal requirements in
many project proposals (for example construction projects) and
must legally be taken into account before a final decision on a
project is made (Bartlett and Baber, 1999; Wiklund, 2005).
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However, these linkages are project-specific, limiting the breadth
of influence, and also do not encourage governmental buy-in
since governmental actors do not usually take an active role in
deliberations. Once again, large-scale integrated assessments have
a higher potential than smaller-scale SPIs, this time in terms of
linking externally to policy debates.
To conclude, large-scale scientific assessments, and especially
the PEM-inspired assessments, seem to have relatively high
potential to realize many of the deliberative criteria. Within their
lifespan, they can provide constant structures for inclusive and
extensive deliberation and transparent justification. Scientific
assessments constitute a valuable means not only of providing
an inclusive space for argumentation and mutual learning but also
of structurally linking the potentially unbounded realm of
diversified public opinion and knowledge production with rule-
making bodies at different policy levels. In taking up the available
scientific knowledge and divergent viewpoints, scientific assess-
ments must be highly receptive on their input-side, assuring a high
degree of representativeness. The assessment process itself can
produce consensus, convergence (through the iterative exploration
of concrete future scenarios, areas of overlap or convergence
between competing ethical claims or policy narratives would likely
be revealed), or at least transparency over divergent viewpoints
and underlying assumptions.6 The assessment process also has the
potential to empower participating actors and actors groups and
to build capacity among and beyond participants. However, much
depends on specific contexts and the more specific design of SPIs.
This section only discussed the relative, basic theoretical potential
of stylized SPIs.
Assessments can actually contribute to deliberative policy
learning
We have argued that assessments, and especially those informed
by the PEM, may have at least as high or even higher theoretical
potential as other SPIs for realizing major building blocks of
deliberative policy learning. We now take a broader (ex-post)
view of large-scale integrated scientific assessments as SPIs, in
order to examine their actual outcomes regarding deliberative
policy learning overall, drawing on empirical evidence from
recent large-scale integrated assessment processes.
The effectiveness of assessments can be limited and some
assessments have considerable weaknesses and shortcomings (see
introduction). Many different factors, preconditions and obstacles
(and sometimes tradeoffs) influence and possibly limit the success
of assessments (Mitchell et al., 2006; Sabatier, 2007), despite their
sometimes explicit ambition to contribute to deliberative policy
learning (for example, Edenhofer and Kowarsch, 2015). For
instance, extensive stakeholder engagement and public participa-
tion techniques in general do not automatically lead to higher
legitimacy and successful deliberation. Rather, they can some-
times even be counter-productive if not well-designed (Ryfe,
2005; Reed, 2008; Edenhofer and Minx, 2014), and become “just
another layer of technocracy” (Rayner, 2003). Consequently,
there are grounds for skepticism (for example, Gluckman, 2016),
especially regarding the real potential of multi-stakeholder,
transnational assessments (Rayner, 2003).
Realizing the criteria from above is thus a necessary but not
sufficient condition for facilitating deliberative policy learning
within SPIs. Hence, the question remains in what sense and to
what extent existing assessments can be shown empirically to
have substantially contributed to the facilitation of deliberative
policy learning. While we cannot discuss the various factors
influencing the impacts and influences of assessment processes on
policy here, we provide some empirical evidence that diverse
assessment processes have actually helped facilitate deliberative
policy learning in the past. We draw on both extensive expert
interviews, which point to policy learning outcomes from selected
global environmental assessments, as well as an empirical
document analysis of the IPCC contributions to UNFCCC
debates. Our analysis confirms what a number of scholars have
noted regarding the relatively high potential of increased
deliberative SPI formats in general (for example, NRC, 1996;
Dunlop and Radaelli, 2013; see also the Aarhus Convention) and
for environmental assessments in particular to facilitate better
environmental policy discourses (for example, Baber and Bartlett,
2001; Norgaard, 2008a; for a review, see Wiklund, 2005).
More specifically, we draw on empirical evidence gathered
from 99 semi-structured interviews.7 Seventy-six of these
interviews were conducted with authors, producers, or other
scientific experts involved in the production of either GEO-5 or
IPCC WGIII AR5, 13 interviews were conducted with
governmental officials who had participated in one of these two
assessments, and 10 interviews were conducted with non-
involved intended target audience of these and other global
environmental assessments. While a large number of individuals
were contacted from each group for interviews in an attempt to
capture as many diverse perspectives as possible, actual interviews
conducted depended largely on the response rate. For authors,
31.5% of requests resulted in an actual interview, 19.4% for
governmental officials, and only 12.7% for intended target
audiences. The interview duration extended from 20 min to 2 h
(55 min on average). The interviews were mainly conducted via
Skype and telephone between August 2013 and February 2015.
All of the interviews were recorded and transcribed with the
participants’ prior consent. The interviews were analysed using
Grounded Theory Analysis methodology in Max QDA software,
with iterative coding employed in order to organize the vast
amount of information collected following the guidance of
Strauss and Corbin (1998). From within the general theme of
GEA impacts and influence, we identified four strands of relevant
information regarding the contribution of GEAs to creating
conditions for policy learning, the perceived value of learning
processes both within and external to GEAs, and the extension of
learning beyond governments and scientific authors to include
also civil society actors. In general, interviewees with long
histories of participating in global environmental assessments
placed particular value on their function as engagement platforms
and the fact that they help integrate numerous divergent
viewpoints. In order to provide a more complete picture, we
complement the results of our empirical analysis by referring to
other examples analysed in the past.
First, the interviews revealed that assessments actually
contribute to the emergence of policy learning. They confirmed
that assessments bring people together and create or solidify the
“sustained collegial interactions” that are central to reflexive
learning about policy issues and the achievement of both policy
and scientific goals (Clark et al., 2011). For instance, the empirical
material we collected points to the fact that the IAASTD
assessment brought people together to discuss issues which some
key actors had not contributed much in the past. This was also
the case of the assessment on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution (LRTAP), which mobilized a wide range of actors
beyond the initial core of scientists from developed countries on
the issue of long-range transboundary air pollution (Selin, 2006).
LRTAP assessment meetings helped various actors to get to know
each other, which facilitated the official negotiations later on
(Selin, 2006). Thus, assessments bridged the cultural gap between
scientists and policy-makers so that policymakers better under-
stood the practical implications for policy of the different
scientific and normative perspectives, and scientist got sensitized
for the political risk and value of different pathways.
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Second, participants find particular value in the learning
processes that occur during assessment processes. The breadth
and the richness of the information synthesized in large-scale
assessments allow researchers, stakeholders and government
representatives to forge connections between disciplinary silos,
policy fields and national experiences. Such processes help policy
actors reframe and refine their understanding of the inter-
connectedness of the environmental, societal and economic
dimensions of policy issues, and to link them in innovative ways.
For instance, GEO-5 and GEO-6 have created opportunities for
policy actors to negotiate the mainstreaming of environmental
concern across the new global development goals and enhance
the integration of this better understanding of interconnected
environmental and economic aspects, both in the formulation of
the goals and the monitoring of progress towards their
achievement. The GEO series thus influenced the Post-2015
Development Agenda (Dodds et al., 2014). Assessments can also,
according to a government representative involved in GEO-5,
provide participants with a unique opportunity to learn about
experiences in other countries. The IPCC focal point of a
developed country explains that the UNFCCC Structured
Expert Dialogue on international climate policy 2014–2015
provided an opportunity to learn about the concerns of different
governments and their perspectives, and to exchange experiences
about how governments have responded to similar issues in
the past.
Finally, assessments not only generate learning among
researchers and policymakers but they also support policy
learning among civil society organizations, which collaborate
with and provide scientific policy advice to local governments, for
instance. One civil society interviewee stated that “we can point
towards experiences in other jurisdictions across the world and
highlight which experiences have been made there and which
lessons have been learned and what things might be better to
avoid when designing [a policy instrument]” highlighting
learning that can be translated directly into scientific policy
advice. Civil society actors use the lessons they draw from global
environmental assessments to raise awareness for environmental
issues and confront running conservative governments with the
lessons learned in assessments processes: “[global environmental
assessments] are mainly useful … as tools to communicate
[messages] to media and also to publics”. For some, the best use
of an assessment is via civil society groups who design arguments
relative to policy instruments and economic arguments about the
creation of jobs and green growth, in order to challenge the status
quo. As one interviewee stated “the real policy-making process is
with civil society”.
The IPCC as an historic, unprecedented deliberation platform.
There is some evidence that the IPCC assessments, particularly
the recent PEM-inspired assessment provided by the Working
Group III on climate change mitigation (IPCC, 2014a), strongly
influenced the negotiations leading to the Paris Agreement on
climate change (adopted in December 2015). The Paris Agree-
ment has to be regarded as a milestone in international envir-
onmental governance, but also a huge achievement of
multilateralism in general. Again, the decisive question is not to
what extent the IPCC directly influenced policy decisions, but
rather to what extent the IPCC helped facilitate deliberative policy
learning in these cases.
In her capacity as Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC,
Christiana Figueres stated that “the ambitious agreement reached
in Paris would not have been possible without the IPCC”.8 The
Paris Agreement actually makes strong reference to the scientific
information provided by the IPCC, for instance:
In order to achieve the long-term temperature goal set out in
Article 2, Parties aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse
gas emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that peaking will
take longer for developing country Parties, and to undertake
rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with best available
science, so as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse
gases in the second half of this century, (Article 4.1, emphasis
added) (See http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/
l09.pdf, accessed 15 May 2016).
Moreover, in the run-up of Paris, the G7 leaders published a
declaration with an explicit reference to concrete numbers taken
from the IPCC assessment, explicitly highlighting the concept of
“decarbonization”, a key concept in the IPCC Working Group III
assessment:
“Mindful of this goal [to hold the increase in global average
temperature below 2 °C] and considering the latest IPCC
results, we emphasize that deep cuts in global greenhouse gas
emissions are required with a decarbonisation of the global
economy over the course of this century. Accordingly, as a
common vision for a global goal of greenhouse gas emissions
reductions we support sharing with all parties to the UNFCCC
the upper end of the latest IPCC recommendation of 40 to
70% reductions by 2050 compared to 2010 recognizing that
this challenge can only be met by a global response” (G-7
Leaders’ Declaration, June 2015) (See https://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2015/06/08/g-7-leaders-declaration,
accessed 15 May 2016).
To illustrate the similarities, see the IPCC summary for
policymakers:
“Scenarios […] consistent with a likely chance to keep
temperature change below 2 °C […] are characterized by
lower global GHG emissions in 2050 than in 2010, 40 to 70%
lower globally, and emissions levels near zero GtCO2eq or
below in 2100” (IPCC, 2014a: 10–12).
The numbers mentioned in the G7 declaration, and the long-
term ambition to achieve zero emissions in the course of the
century, have been an important building block of the options
discussed in the UNFCCC negotiations in Paris. In the end, these
numbers were dropped, but the requirements of achieving net
zero emissions in the long-term has been maintained in the final
text of the Paris Agreement.
As some of the co-authors of this paper were involved in the
IPCC assessment processes and attended some IPCC plenaries as
well as the very effective Structured Expert Dialogue on
international climate policy held in 2014 and 2015 under the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), we
had the opportunity to witness, in our interpretation, the
remarkable effectiveness of these IPCC-related processes in terms
of enabling deliberation and learning about policy problems and
the policy solution space (that is, policy alternatives and their
implications). In this context, all stakeholders involved (including
the scientists) especially learned about the costs, technologies,
policies, institutional requirements, synergies and tradeoffs of
ambitious climate change mitigation efforts to keep global
mean temperature below 2 °C as agreed by the international
community.
Multiple countries consider the IPCC to be the main source of
information to the UNFCCC (e.g. IPCC, 2013) and a “reference
point for policy debates at global level” (EU, a view also shared by
Denmark, see IPCC, 2014b). Finland (IPCC, 2013) perceives the
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IPCC to be “the most significant science-policy interface
institution, which has a global impact on political decision
making” and points at “the ability [of the IPCC] to respond
efficiently to questions and needs that arise in the UNFCCC
process”. A high-level UNFCCC interview respondent points
that: “Of course, we are the main client of IPCC and as such, we
interact with IPCC in various ways”. Interfaces such as the
UNFCCC Structured Expert Dialogue have evolved towards
providing platforms by which information is exchanged between
UNFCCC and IPCC in an iterative manner and in a more
informal manner than international processes, which often
emphasize negotiation rather than actual deliberation, usually
allow for, as our interviews reveal. One government official
interviewed explained that the Structured Expert Dialogue gives
“you an opportunity of a real give-and-take, (…), a real-time
Q&A (…)”. A UNFCCC high level interviewee explains that
parties who had participated in a previous expert structured
dialogue would come back to ask the IPCC experts more specific
questions, pointing at potential contradictions that had developed
over time in the scientific discourse of IPCC authors. For
instance, the Structured Expert Dialogue in Lima 2014 helped
clarify the positions of the countries regarding short-lived climate
pollutants, which accelerated the UNFCCC negotiations as the
negotiators could start to discuss the synergetic effects of these
pollutants right away—for instance synergies between mitigation
and adaptation short-term health effects and longer-term climate
effects.
Although representation in the IPCC is still focused on
governments and scientists, it is in our opinion a unique, historic
deliberative learning platform. International climate policy
negotiations have been influenced by the IPCC assessments over
decades already, leading inter alia to the Paris Agreement. The
IPCC furthermore managed to evolve over time and to adapt to
the changing political contexts, as well as to improve its structure,
procedures and methodologies. As a large-scale deliberative
learning platform, the IPCC is virtually unprecedented. In terms
of the large scale and societal relevance of the deliberation
process, it can perhaps be compared with the process leading to
the adoption of the Human Rights Declaration after World War
II, or with Catholic Ecumenical Councils such as the Second
Vatican Council (1962–1965). Notwithstanding the need for
continuous IPCC reform, some of the critics of the IPCC in the
past may have overlooked its remarkable value for contributing to
the facilitation of international deliberative policy learning to
some extent, and for linking the IPCC to deliberation among
publics around the world.
Conclusion: the promise of assessment-making
This study has provided: (1) a normative idea for what the
ultimate goal of SPIs for longer-term, wicked policy issues could
be: contributing to the facilitation of deliberative policy learning;
(2) a subsequent criteria-based discussion of alternative SPIs
regarding their theoretical potential to achieve this ultimate goal,
finding that PEM-inspired assessments seem to have relatively
high potential; and (3) some anecdotal evidence that large-scale
integrated scientific assessment processes are actually contribut-
ing to deliberative policy learning overall. Although the focus in
this article is on environment-related global policy issues and
assessments, the promises of assessment-making as a key tool at
the SPI are certainly also relevant for policy fields and scientific
advice beyond the environmental realm (see also Kowarsch,
2016a).
These results, however, do not show that assessments are
always and necessarily better than other SPIs responding to
longer-term, wicked policy issues. Moreover, these other SPIs are
sometimes definitely needed as well in these contexts. One reason
is that, despite the long time horizon of these wicked issues, there
can be short-term windows of opportunity for political action,
more specific pressing issues requiring rapid response from
scientific experts and so on, for which time-consuming assess-
ments might not be the first choice. Because they can enable later
larger-scale assessments of alternative policy pathways, there is
furthermore an important role for individual studies that explore
only a particular policy pathway in depth.
However, when measured against alternative SPIs, well-
designed large-scale integrated scientific assessments are highly
promising and perhaps indispensable SPIs to bridge scientific
expertise and policy-making on longer-term, wicked policy
problems such as the difficult achievement of the SDGs. Such
assessments are potentially more comprehensive, more inte-
grated, and—through the inclusion of divergent viewpoints and
diverse stakeholders—more politically legitimate. In many policy
cases, it’s very likely that there would actually be sufficient time to
organize a broader deliberation process despite what some might
have said. For example, climate policy has already been debated
for three decades.
How do assessments (and other SPIs) actually manage to
achieve considerable influence on policy? Even if assessments
realize the major building blocks of deliberative policy learning,
other factors may still be highly relevant as well, including in
particular political constraints (for example, described by Cairney
et al., 2016). In fact, some governments and other stakeholders do
not always have much sympathy for an open, public and critical
scientific exploration of policy alternatives, since they want to
primarily protect their particular interests (e.g. Edenhofer and
Minx, 2014). However, large-scale assessments can perhaps better
cope with this challenge than other SPIs. If a critical mass of
(diverse) actors becomes involved in a large-scale, mandated
assessment process, it may become hard for particular interest
groups to avoid any engagement in an open deliberation process,
that is, in the open exchange of scientifically informed arguments
(Sabatier, 2007). This helps to unfold and scrutinize established
political beliefs and “information shortcuts” (Cairney et al., 2016).
Many large-scale assessment bodies are intergovernmental
organizations with mandates from governing bodies which
further helps to facilitate buy-in from governments regarding
assessment results. Finally, if the publicly accessible output of an
assessment process is a reasonable cartography of alternative
policy pathways and their implications, this can influence
broader public discourses and, with it, put some pressure on
governments to also accept inconvenient insights. Future research
should examine the more precise conditions under which
policymakers and particular interest groups accept an open
exploration of policy alternatives particularly in intergovern-
mental, “hybrid” SPIs, and the extent to which particular
policy narratives of particular stakeholder groups change during
the course of an assessment. While this paper mainly focused on
the science-policy nexus, future research should also more
thoroughly address the various roles of and multiple interactions
with societies and different publics regarding different SPIs. We
have argued above that deliberative design of large-scale
assessments provides the opportunity to bring scientific
expertise, policy-making processes and the broader society better
together.
Another considerable political challenge for those large-scale
assessments that address global policy issues (such as climate
change or the SDGs) is that politically, to varying degrees
depending on the specific policy issue, these issues are also, or
even primarily, addressed at national and local levels in diverse
contexts. Large-scale assessments usually have not much
to say about these. While this multi-scale issue cannot be
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satisfactorily discussed in a few lines here (for a deeper discussion
see, for example, Berkes et al., 2006 and Cash et al., 2006),
we believe that this challenge does not make global assess-
ments meaningless for the national and local level. To mention
just one example, global assessments may facilitate the
global dissemination of particularly interesting national and
local policy lessons that are also highly relevant to some other
contexts.
Related to this is another important issue, namely the various
necessary but sometimes ineffective links between national
structures of scientific expertise and international assessment
bodies (or other international SPIs). Again, this cannot be
discussed here, but would ideally be part of a future research
agenda.
Also in light of these various limitations and open questions,
evaluating science-policy interfaces, including large-scale assess-
ments, in a rigorous, consistent and collaborative manner is
absolutely crucial to improve processes of evidence-informed
policy making. This requires effective, perhaps formalized
processes to facilitate the uptake of lessons learned regarding
past processes of evidence-informed policy making to inform the
design of future science-policy interactions. It also requires
processes to facilitate more explicit and systematic, multi-
stakeholder critical discussions about the different potential
methods of evaluation (and about the underlying different
normative understandings of both policy processes and scientific
knowledge production). A number of alternative evaluation
criteria and guidelines for SPIs exists (for example, OECD, 2015;
Cash et al., 2003). Many of them focus on more specific, practical
issues and might thus be complementary to our approach. The
“metrics of success” of SPIs, that is, the measurements of actual or
envisaged impacts of scientific advisory bodies on policy
processes etc., or their enabling conditions, must, however, go
beyond the overly narrow and unrealistic (yet still predominant)
assumption of SPIs directly influencing policy decisions (see also
Cash et al., 2003; Rayner, 2003; Mitchell et al., 2006). Such criteria
should rather emphasize the diverse, indirect yet valuable
influences that SPIs can have on broader policy discourses
including, for instance, agenda-setting and the diffusion of
programmatic policy ideas (such as, for example, Emissions
Trading Schemes).
A feasible and desirable outcome for SPIs in light of our
deliberative criteria may thus be confronting and enriching policy
discourses, rather than seeking to directly determine policy
decisions. Assessments can substantially contribute to such
deliberative policy learning and thus indirectly help facilitate
“learning democracy” (Ansell, 2011). Against a backdrop of
current isolationist nationalism in some countries and the wicked
policy challenges and crises of the 21st century, there are
compelling reasons to bolster global cooperation based on
inclusive, transnational deliberative policy learning (including
participation of those disappointed by the political establish-
ment). The impressive milestones recently achieved in interna-
tional governance, such as the Paris Agreement and the signing of
the SDGs, along with bottom-up democracy movements around
the world, should encourage greater faith in multilateral
cooperation and collaborative deliberation. International solidar-
ity and societal coherence can possibly be strengthened by
anchoring policy proposals within deliberatively democratic
processes. Thus, the laborious deliberatively democratic science-
policy approaches may be the worst responses to such over-
lapping and interconnected challenges, apart from all the others.
Actively “to participate in the making of knowledge is the highest
prerogative of man and the only warrant of his freedom” (Dewey,
quoted in Brown, 2009: 135).
Notes
1 Although there is no consensus on the more precise meaning of complexity in public
policy, this term basically refers to policy phenomena emerging from (but being
greater than the sum of) many interacting elements, while being highly sensitive to
initial conditions and typically evolving in a non-linear manner, adapting to changing
environments (OECD, 2009; Cairney, 2012). Furthermore, while complex problems
are not necessarily complicated, wicked policy problems certainly are complicated.
2 For a more detailed characterization see Rittel and Webber (1973); Carley and Christie
(2000: 156); Head (2008).
3 For more information about the IPCC’s organizational structure, processes and history
see http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_structure.shtml (accessed 20
October 2016).
4 Also the MA, IAASTD and IPBES, for instance, are more or less in line with the
particular PEM claim to highlight and explore divergent viewpoints in assessments
(although these assessments are obviously are not explicitly following the PEM model
which was developed more recently). See also the section on the different science-
policy interfaces above.
5 Following the PEM idea, conflicts could perhaps be more resolvable (and less divisive
or ideological) when assessing and comparing concrete future scenarios based on
alternative disputed normative ideas, rather than potentially endless disputes about the
abstract normative ideas themselves (Kowarsch and Edenhofer, 2016). A key tool of
policy debates and policy learning alike are policy narratives to provide a simplified
orientation of complex value-laden policy issues (Shanahan et al., 2011; Urhammer
and Røpke, 2013). Assessments of alternative policy pathways and their implications
could provide the necessary evidence base and capacity to facilitate learning, that is,
changes, regarding the policy narratives held by different stakeholder groups.
6 Through deliberation, principles and values which are often implicitly used to judge
policy options can be made apparent in assessments. This in turn makes it possible to
translate them into more specific and concrete metrics or indicators for explicitly and
critically evaluating the acceptability of different policy pathways or policy options
(Kowarsch and Edenhofer, 2016). Earlier IPCC assessments, for example, strove to
avoid normative-ethical discussions entirely. However, disputed normative assump-
tions are often “hidden” in policy-relevant scientific findings anyway (Biewald et al.,
2015). In its recent assessment, however, the IPCC Working Group III added a chapter
explicitly discussing ethical issues (IPCC, 2014a, Chapter 3), which is a remarkable
deliberative achievement in our view.
7 The interviews were mainly conducted to inform the research initiative on “The Future
of Global Environmental Assessment Making” (http://www.mcc-berlin.net/en/
research/cooperation/unep.html, accessed 11 November 2016). In addition, our
involvement in recent IPCC and UNEP GEO processes as well as in several multi-
stakeholder workshops on assessment-making provided us with opportunities to
collect information on how governments and scientific experts perceive the delib-
erative value of assessment-making. Given the rigorous interview methodology applied
according to the state of the art, our involvement in recent assessment processes does
not make our results considerably biased. The claims about the overall value of the
IPCC assessments further below are, however, more opinionated (as made transparent
there).
8 See her video briefing to the IPCC Plenary in April 2016 (min 0:56), available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= lZpTr5kOpGU (accessed 15 May 2016).
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